Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1963

Leo Van Zyverden and Sytske Van Zyverden v.
Ralph W. Farrar and Helen R. Farrar et al : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Ronald C. Barker; Attorney for Appellant;
George M. McMillan; Attorney for Respondents;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Zyverden v. Farrar, No. 9946 (Utah Supreme Court, 1963).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/4325

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF\ uTAt-(
_ _ _[.w.-.......,
gc ,,
sE. p fJ - ., 0 :..
LEO VAN ZYVERDEN and SYTSKE .
VAN ZYVERDEN, his wife, ____ ....ci~rk~--s~ ..
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.
RALPH W. FARRAR and HELEN R.
FARRAR, his wife, and
SEAGULL INVESTMENT COMPANY,
Defendants and Appellants.
SEAGULL INVESTMENT COMPANY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
LEO VAN ZYVERDEN and SYTSKE
VAN ZYVERDEN, his wife,
Defendants and Respondents.

·ne

0

-c~~rl:-iit~h----·--·

No. 9945

No. 9946

BRIEF OF APPELLANT, SEAGULL INVESTMENT
COMPANY
Appeal from the Judgment of the Judgment of
the Fourth Judicial District Court for Wasatch County,
Honorable R. L. Tuckett, Judge

George M. McMillan
1020 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
.A.ttorney for Van Zyverdens

Ronald C. Barker, 2870 S.
State St., Salt Lake City,
Utah, Attorney for Seagull
Investment Company

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page No.
Statement of the Kind of Case..........................................
Disposition in Lower Court...............................................
Relief Sought on AppeaL ............... ____________________________________

1
2
2

Statement of Facts·----·-·········----····-----·-··-··----------··-------·-·······
Argument .. _.......... _. ____ .. ______ ____________ ____________ ________ _________ __________

2
6

POINT I
THE STATEMENTS CONTAINED IN REQUESTS
FOR ADMISSION ARE DEEMED ADMITTED BY
VAN ZYVERDENS AND ACCORDINGLY SEAGULL IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A
MATTER OF LAW·-----------------------------------------------------------POINT II
SEAGULL IS ENTITL.ED TO RESTITUTION OF
THE FARM AND TO DAMAGES UNDER THE
TERMS OF EXHIBIT 1 AND ALSO TO RESTITUTION AND DAMAGES UNDER THE UNLAWFUL DETAINER STATUTES.__________________________________________

6

8

POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT ADMITTING EXHIBIT 5, A SUBSEQUENT NOTICE TO QUIT,
INTO EVIDENCE AND IN FAILING TO DETERMINE THE ULTIMATE RIGHTS OF THE
PARTIES RE POSSESSION OF FARM. ______________________ 14
POINT IV
THE COURT SHOULD HAVE AWARDED SEAGULL THE RELIEF TO WHICH IT WAS
ENTITLED WHETHER DEMANDED OR NOT. ________ 21
POINT V
SEAGULL IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT
AGAINST VAN ZYVERDENS FOR TAXES,
WATER ASSESSMENTS AND DAMAGES DEMANDED BUT NOT RULED UPON BY THE
COURT. .._________ ._____ ----------------------------------------------------------------- 23

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd.)
POINT VI
SEAGULL IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT
AGAINST VAN ZYVERDENS FOR ATTORNEY
FEES. _____ ------------______ _____ _______ ___ _______ __ __ ____ ___ ____________________ ___ _______ 23
Conclusion __ ________ _____ __ ____ ______ ______ ___ _________ ______ ______ __________ ____ _____ 25
AUTHORITIES CITED
Blackham v. Snelgrove, 3 U.2d 156, 380 P.2d 453, 455 ____
Buehner Block Co. v. Glezos, 6 U. 2d 226, 310 P.2d 517 __
Burt v. Stringfellow, 45 U. 207, 143 P. 234________________________
Christy v. Guild, 101 U. 313, 121 P.2d 401 ________________________
Forrester v. Cook, 77 U. 137, 153, 292 P. 206 ______________ 14,
Pacific Development Co. v. Stewart,
113 u. 403, 195 p .2d 748______________________________________________
U dy v. Jensen, 63 U. 94, 222 P. 597---------------------------------Van Zyverden v. District Court, Stewart M. Hanson,
Judge, and Seagull Investment Co., Case No.
9917, Supreme Court of the State of Utah ______________
Wheelwright v. Roman, 50 U. 10, 165 P. 513 ____________________
Wilson v. Oldroyd, 1 U.2d 362, 267 P.2d 759, 763 ____________

16
22
24
14
24
14
24
18
22
16

STATUTES CITED
78-3'6-3 ( 5), UCA, 1953 ____________________________________________ 10, 11, 13
78-36-10, UCA, 1953 __________________________ ------------------------------10, 13
RULES CITED
Rule
Rule
Rule
Rule
Rule
Rule
Rule

8 (a), URCP ---------------------------------------------------------------15 (a), URCP -------------------------------------------------------------15 (b), URCP -------------------------------------------------------------15 (d), URCP -------------~-----------------------------------------------36 (a), URCP -------------------------------------------------------------54 (c) ( 1), URCP --------------------------------------------------20,
55 (a) ( 1), URCP --------------------------------------------------------

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16
17
17
18
6
22
6

IN THE
OF

SUPREME COURT
THE STATE OF UTAH

LEO VAN ZYVERDEN and SYTSKE
VAN ZYVERDEN, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.
RALPH W. FARRAR and HELEN R.
FARRAR, his wife, and
SEAGULL INVESTMENT COMPANY,
Defendants and Appellants.

No. 9945

SEAGULL INVESTMENT COMPANY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
LEO VAN ZYVERDEN and SYTSKE
VAN ZYVERDEN, his wife,
Defendants and Respondents.

No. 9946

BRIEF OF APPELLANT, SEAGULL INVESTMENT
COMPANY

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Van Zyverdens as buyers of a farm, on a Uniform Real
Estate Contract, commenced an action (No. 9945) against
Farrars as sellers and Seagull as assignees of Farrars'
interest thereunder, alleging breach of contract by both
Farrars and Seagull and thereby attempting to excuse
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their non-performance of the contract and seeking to
recover damages.
Seagull, as assignee of the sellers' interest in said contract, commenced an action (Case No. 9946) against Van
Zyverdens and filed a counterclaim (Case No. 9945) for
damages for breach of contract, attorney fees, restitution
of the farm and for unlawful detainer.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The two cases (Nos. 9945 and 9946) were joined for
trial in the District Court pursuant to stipulation of
counsel. The cases were tried before the Court, setting
without a jury, and judgment of no cause of action was
entered against all parties on all claims for relief.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant, Seagull Investment Company, seeks an
order vacating the judgment of no cause of action against
it on the claims for relief contained in its complaint and
counterclaim and judgment against Van Zyverdens for
restitution of possession of the farm, damages for breach
of contract, attorney fees, interest, triple damages for
unlawful detainer and costs, or, in the alternative, for an
order remanding the case to the District Court for a new
trial on the issues contained in its complaint and counterclaim.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
These lawsuits are concerned with a dairy farm near
Heber City, Utah, which was purchased in September,
1960, by Van Zyverdens from Farrars (R. 226) for
$60,000.00, with a down payment of $5,00Q.OO recited in
the contract (R. 226) but which was not paid (R. 20).
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Farrar~

assigned their interest as sellers under the uniform real estate contract (R. 226) to Seagull Investment
Company (R. 242). Van Zyverdens defaulted in the performance of their obligations under said contract (R. 226)
in many particulars, including, but not limited to, their
failure to pay the property taxes assessed against the
farm (R. 543, L. 30, R. 544, L. 1-11), failure to pay the
water assessments for irrigation water for the farm (R.
544, L. 7-21), failure to keep the premises insured (R. 544,
L. 5-9) and failure to pay the annual payments due on the
purchase price on or before the 1st day of November,
1961, and 1962 (R. 544, L. 19-24). Van Zyverdens have
paid nothing toward the purchase price of the farm (R.
543, L. 20-30, R. 544, L. 1-24) although they have had
possession of the farm since September, 1960 (R. 226).
The grace period for the payment by Van Zyverdens of
the first annual payment on the purchase price of the
farm expired November 30, 1961 (R. 226), and on December 1, 1961, Van Zyverdens commenced legal action (Case
No. 9945) , claiming damages for alleged breach of contract by Farrars and Seagull and asked for $18,000.00
credit against the purchase price for the alleged damages
or in the alternative for judgment for that amount.
Seagull made written demand upon Van Zyverdens on
November 15, 1961, for payment of the 1961 property
taxes and the installment of $6,334.17 due on the purchase
price on November 1, 1961 (R. 33, 288), and on December
1, 1961 sent them (mailed them) a notice to remedy their
default or to quit (R. 32, 287) which was refused by Van
Zyverdens (see discussion under point I).
Seagull caused a notice of default (R. 266-272) to be
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served upon Van Zyverdens about January 3, 1963,
wherein Seagull elected, under paragraph 16A of the real
estate contract (R. 226), to terminate the interest of Van
Zyverdens in and to said farm and the real estate conract
at the end of 5 days, in the event that they failed to
remedy their defaults within that time, and notified Van
Zyverdens that they would thereafter be guilty of unlawful detainer if they failed to vacate and surrender said
premises. Van Zyverdens failed to remedy their default
or to surrender the farm and Seagull commenced an
action (Case No. 9946) against Van Zyverdens, seeking
restitution of the premises, damages for breach of contract, attorney fees and triple damages for unlawful
detainer.
Seagull caused another notice (R. 233-240) to be served
upon Van Zyverdens (R. 60-61, Ex. 5) on or about the
lOth day of February, 1962, wherein Van Zyverdens were
informed that if for any reason the previous notices
served were insufficient, that they would be guilty of
unlawful detainer if they failed to vacate said premises
within 5 days after service of that notice. Van Zyverdens
still failed to remedy their default or to quit, and on or
about the 13th day of February, 1962, Seagull filed a
counterclaim (R. 40-43) against Van Zyverdens in the
action already commenced by Van Zyverdens (No. 9945),
wherein Seagull asked for damages for breach of contract,
attorney fees and triple damages for unlawful detainer.
At the trial Seagull offered the February 10, 1963 notice
(R. 233-240) in evidence (R. 546) and, upon objection by
Van Zyverdens as to its admissability on the alleged
grounds that it was served after these actions were commenced (which is untrue as to No. 9945), the Court took
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the question of its admissability under advisement (R.
546, L. 9-12) but never ruled on this matter. Seagull
moved for permission to amend its pleadings to refer to
the notice of February 10, 1963, when Van Zyverdens
objected to its admissability, but this motion was not
granted (R. 61).
Seagull served certain requests for admissions upon
Van Zyverdens on the 27th day of January, 1962 (R. 2638, 281-293). The default of Van Zyverdens for failure to
admit or deny said requests for admissions as required by
law was entered on February 7, 1962 (R. 39, 294). These
default certificates have never been stricken or set aside.
No answers have ever been filed to the requests for
admissions in Case No. 9946, and accordingly the statements contained therein are deemed to be admitted. A
partial answer to the requests for admissions served in
Case No. 9945 was filed by Van Zyverdens after the time
for answer thereof had expired and accordingly the statements contained in those requests for admission are also
deemed admitted (see discussion under point I).
The cases were tried on December 4, 1962, before the
Court, anct a decision was signed by the Honorable R. L.
Tuckett, District Judge, on the 28th day of March, 1963
(R. 189-190), wherein the Court awarded judgment of no
cause of action against Van Zyverdens and Farrars and
also against Seagull on the grounds that the notice of
January 3, 1963 (R. 266-273) was insufficient in that said
notice allegedly failed to give Van Zyverdens an option
to perform the conditions or to surrender or quit the
premises (R. 190). No mention was made in that decision
of the notice of February 10, 1962 (R. 233-240), or conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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cerning the other claims for relief asserted by Seagull
(R. 40-43). Seagull moved the Court to amend its decision (R. 191-195) and pointed out to the Court that the
notice expressly gave Van Zyverdens the option to remedy their default or to quit (R. 191-192), however, the
Court denied Seagull's motion (R. 215).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE STATEMENTS CONTAINED IN REQUESTS
FOR ADMISSION ARE DEEMED ADMITTED BY VAN
ZYVERDENS AND ACCORDINGLY SEAGULL IS
ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.
Requests for admission were served upon Van Zyverdens by Seagull on January 27, 1962, in both cases (R. 2629, 281-285), and on February 7, 1962, the default of Van
Zyverdens was entered in both cases (R. 39, 294) in accordance with Rule 55 (a) (1), URCP, by reason of their
failure to respond thereto. The requests for admission
were not denied within the time allowed by law, the
default certificates have never been set aside and the
statements contained therein are deemed admitted in
accordance with the provisions of Rule 36 (a), URCP.
Motions to strike the requests for admission which were
filed by Van Zyverdens on January 31, 1962 (R. 25, 280),
do not comply with the express requirements of Rule
36 (a) in several particulars including the requirement
that objections be served with a notice of hearing at the
earliest practicable time and accordingly the motions to
strike are insufficient to prevent the admissions from
being deemed to be admitted.
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The proported answers to a part of the requests for
admissions, in Case No. 9945, were untimely and accordingly were without legal force or effect to avoid the
admission of the statements contained therein.
The objections to the requests for admissions which
were raised by Van Zyverdens in their motions to strike
the requests for admissions were disposed of on February
5, 1962, by the Court striking the default certificate which
had been entered against Seagull in Case No. 9945. Even
if the motions to strike had been well taken and properly
served (which we deny), their objections were disposed
of by the striking of said default on February 5, 1962, and
accordingly the requests for admission were deemed admitted 10 days after that date since no answer or
objections were filed within that time.
The requests for admissions served in Case No. 9946
have never been answered by either Van Zyverden, and
the requests for admission served in Case No. 9945 have
never been answered by Sytske Van Zyverden (R. 48-50),
although a separate answer was required from both Leo
and Sytske Van Zyverden (R. 26), and accordingly the
statements contained therein are deemed to be admitted
as to Sytske Van Zyverden in both cases and as to both
Van Zyverdens in Case No. 9946.
In both cases Seagull asks for restitution of the premises, damages for breach of contract, attorney fees and for
triple damages under the unlawful detainer statute. The
relief sought by Seagull and to which Seagull is entitled
is more fully discussed under other points in this brief
and will not be reviewed here, however, the admission of
the facts stated in the requests for admissions entitled
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Seagull to relief under all of its claims for relief, including
but not limited to relief under the unlawful detainer
statute, since the admission of the statement contained in
request for admission No. 20 (R. 27, 283) is an admission
that Van Zyverdens are guilty of unlawful detainer.
POINT II
SEAGULL IS ENTITLED TO RESTITUTION OF THE
FARM AND TO DAMAGES UNDER THE TERMS OF
EXHIBIT 1 AND ALSO TO RESTITUTION AND DAMAGES UNDER THE UNLAWFUL DETAINER ST. .t\T.
UTES.
Seagull elected to exercise its rights under paragraph
16A of Exhibit 1 (R. 226) on December 1, 1961, when
Van Zyverdens defaulted in making their first annual
payment of $6,334.17, due on the purchase price of the
farm, and the payment of irrigation water assess1nents
due on the farm of $333.98, by mailing a notice of default
to Van Zyverdens wherein Van Zyverdens were given an
option to remedy their default or to quit (R. 32, 287).
Van Zyverdens admitted the mailing of that letter by
Seagull and their refusal of delivery thereof by reason of
their failure to respond to requests for admissions No. 3,
4 and 5 (R. 26, 281) (see also discussion under point I
above). Under the terms of paragraph 16A of exhibit 1
(R. 226), and the election contained in that notice, Van
Zyverdens became tenants at will of the farm on December 7, 1961, and accordingly were tenants at will when
the January 3, 1962 notice (R. 266-273) was served, and
Van Zyverdens became guilty of unlawful detainer 5 days
thereafter when they failed to remedy their default.
On January 3, 1962, Seagull served upon Van Zyver-
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dens an instrument entitled "NOTICE OF TERMINATION OF CONTRACT and FIVE DAY NOTICE TO
VACATE PREMISES" (R. 266-273). A copy of the contract (R. 266, Ex. 1) and the assignment of the sellers'
interest in that contract (R. 247, Ex. 10) were annexed to
that notice and incorporated therein by reference. The
Court based its decision of no cause of action against
Seagull upon the grounds that said notice (R. 266-273)
allegedly did not require the performance of the conditions or the surrender of the premises and accordingly
was insufficient in the view of the Court to sustain
Seagull's claims for relief. In its decision the Court
recited the alleged deficiency in said notice as follows:
" ... The notice recited the defaults under the contract, but nowhere were the Van Zyverdens required
to perform the conditions or to surrender or quit the
premises. Under the statute and the cases construing
the same, it appears to the Court that service of a
proper notice is an essential part of the plaintiff's and
counterclaimant's cause of action .... " (R. 190) (emphasis added) .
It is difficult to understand how the Court could fail to
observe the options given Van Zyverdens in that notice,
to remedy their default, unless only the heading of that
notice were read. Seagull fully complied with the provisions of paragraph 16A of the contract (R. 226), concerning termination of Van Zyverdens' rights under the
terms of the contract, and, with the requirements of the
Unlawful Detainer Statute, and Seagull is entitled to
restitution of the premises and to the other relief requested, under the terms of the contract (R. 226) and/or
under the provisions of the Unlawful Detainer Statutes,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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78-36-3 (5), 78-36-10, UCA, 1953, and related statutes.
Van Zyverdens were fully advised in said notice (R. 226)
that they could, within 5 days after service of that notice,
remedy their defaults under the contract and thereby
avoid forfeiture of their interest under the contract. Van
Zyverdens failed to do so and 5 days thereafter, if they
were not already tenants at will because of the December
1, 1961 notice, became tenants at will of the farm, and
thereupon Seagull became entitled to possession of the
farm as provided in said paragraph 16A (R. 226). The
following is a summary of some of the various ways which
Seagull informed Van Zyverdens in that notice of their
option to remedy their default or to quit:
1. The notice (R. 268) informed Van Zyverdens that
Seagull had elected the remedy mentioned in paragraph
16A of the contract (R. 226), and a copy of that contract
was attached to the notice. Said paragraph 16A reads in
part as follows:
" ... upon failure of the buyer to remedy the default
within five (5) days after written notice ... the buyer
agrees that the seller may, at his option, re-enter and
take possession of said premises without legal process
as in its first and former estate, together with all
improvements and additions made by the buyer
thereon, and the said additions and improvements
shall remain with the land and become the property
of the seller, the buyer becoming at once a tenant at
will of the seller . ... " (R. 226) (emphasis added)
That paragraph of Exhibit 1 (R. 226) clearly specifies
that Van Zyverdens could remedy their default within 5
days after written notice, and accordingly said notice was
sufficient to comply yvith both the forfeiture requirements
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of that paragraph of the contract, since all of the terms
thereof were recited by reference, and to constitute Van
Zyverdens tenants at will. Reference to that paragraph in
the notice was also sufficient to satisfy the requirements
of the statute which specifies when persons who hold
property under the terms of an agreement are guilty of
unlawful detainer, which statute reads in part as follows:
78-36-3 ( 5). " ... when he continues in possession, in
person or by sub-tenant, after a neglect or failure to
perform any condition or covenant of the lease or
agreement under which the property is held, other
than those hereinbefore mentioned, and after notice
in writing requiring in the alternative the performance of such conditions or the surrender of the premises, served upon him, ... " (Emphasis added)
Van Zyverdens were in default under the terms of the
agreement under which they held the property, they
failed to vacate the premises or to perform the conditions
within 5 days after service of the notice (R. 266-273) and
accordingly thereupon became guilty of unlawful detainer under the provisions of the above mentioned statute.
2. The notice (R. 268-269) refers to the specific unlawful detainer statute quoted in paragraph 1 above. That
statute expressly gives Van Zyverdens an option to remedy their default within 5 days after service of the notice,
and accordingly reference to that statute, without more, is
sufficient to appraise Van Zyverdens of their rights to
reinstate and is sufficient to comply with the requirements of that statute concerning notice.
3. The notice (R. 268) informed Van Zyverdens of the
election of Seagull, under paragraph 16A (R. 226), to
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terminate Van Zyverdens' interest in and to the contract
and farm, in the event that they failed to remedy their
default within 5 days, which notice was clearly sufficient
under the terms of exhibit 1 (R. 226) to entitle Seagull to
restitution of the premises by reason of breach of contract
by Van Zyverdens, and/or also under the unlawful detainer statutes. The . portion of the notice pertaining
thereto reads in part as follows:
"NOW THEREFORE, you are hereby notified that
Seagull Investment Company does elect to exercise
its rights as provided by sub-paragraph 'A' of paragraph 16 of the contract annexed hereto as exhibit
'A' to be released from all obligation in law and
equity to convey said property and to terminate your
interest in and to said premises at the end of five
days after service of this notice upon you in the event
that you fail to remedy the aforesaid defaults and to
fully perform all of your obligations under said contract within said time; that in the event that you
fully perform all of your obligations under said contract within that time you may reinstate said contract." (R. 268) (Emphasis added)
4. The notice (R. 268-269) again informed Van Zyverdens of their option to remedy their default within the
5-day period mentioned in the notice and that, if they
failed to do so, legal action would be commenced against
them for restitution of the premises, triple damages for
unlawful detainer, etc., which by itself is sufficient to
entitle Seagull to restitution of the premises and the
other relief sought by Seagull under the provisions of
paragraph 16A of the contract (R. 226) andjor the unlawful detainer statute. The portion of the notice pertaining thereto reads in part as follows:
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~'You

are further notified that in the event that you
fail to remedy your defaults in performance of the
covenants and conditions which you are obligation
(sic) to perform under the terms of said contract,
within five days after service of this notice upon you,
that you will be guilty of Unlawful Detainer of said
premises in accordance with the provisions of 78-363 ( 5), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and that thereafter
you will be liable for three times the amount of
damages assessed for said unlawful detainer as provided by 78-36-10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 and
related statutes, and that legal action will be commenced against you for restitution of said premises,
treble damages, attorney fees, court costs, etc .... "
(R. 268-269) (Emphasis added)
Clearly Seagull complied with the requirements of
paragraph 16A of Exhibit 1 (R. 226) and, in accordance
with the provisions of that paragraph, Van Zyverdens
became tenants at will of said premises at the end of 5
days after written notice and their failure to remedy their
default, if for any reason they were not tenants at will on
December 7, 1961 as indicated above. The first written
notice was mailed on December 1, 1961, and delivery
thereof was refused by Van Zyverdens (and as demonstrated above, said facts were established, as a result of
failure to answer requests for admissions). Clearly notice
cannot be defeated by the mere refusal to accept delivery
of the notice, particularly where the parties had been
corresponding about this matter through the mails (R. 33,
288). The notice served on January 3, 1962, complied with
the requir·ements of paragraph 16A of Exhibit 1 and in
any event, Van Zyverdens became tenants at will of said
premises five days after service of that notice by reason
of their failure to remedy their default as provided
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therein as indicated in paragraph 16A of Exhibit 1 (R.
226) quoted above.
Seagull is clearly entitled to restitution of the premises,
damages, attorney fees and other relief requested in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 16A of exhibit
1, independent of the unlawful detainer statute, and as
requested in its complaint (R. 261, Par. 1) and its counterclaim (R. 42) . The Court failed to rule upon this relief
requested by Seagull and limited its decision to the question of Seagull's right to recover under the unlawful
detainer statute. It has been demonstrated above that the
ruling of the Court, to the effect that Seagull failed to
give Van Zyverdens an option to remedy their default or
to quit in the notice, was in error, and accordingly Seagull
is also entitled to restitution of the premises and to triple
damages under the unlawful detainer statute as also independently requested by Seagull in the complaint (R.
262, Par. 4) and the counterclaim (R. 42-43, Par. 5). It is
common practice, under a contract for the sale of realty
containing the usual forfeiture clause, to brjng an unlawful detainer against a defaulting vendee. Christy v. Guild,
101 U. 313, 121 P.2d 401; Forrester v. Cook, 77 U. 137, 153,
292 P. 206; Pacific Development Co. v. Stewart, 113 U.
403, 195 p .2d 748.
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT ADMITTING EXHIBIT 5, A SUBSEQUENT NOTICE TO QUIT, INTO
EVIDENCE, AND IN FAILING TO DETERMINE THE
ULTIMATE RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES CONCERNING
THE FARM.
After Seagull's complaint had been filed in Case No.
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9946 (Jan. 16, 1962- back of R. 273) and before the
counterclaim was filed by Seagull in Case No. 9945 (Feb.
13, 1962- back of R. 44) Seagull caused Exhibit 5 (R.
233-240) to be served on Van Zyverdens on the lOth day
of February, 1962 (R. 240). A copy of the notice to
remedy default or to quit, served upon Van Zyverdens on
January 3, 1962 (R. 266-273), was attached to Exhibit 5
and incorporated therein by reference (R. 234-239).
Exhibit 5 informed Van Zyverdens that, if for any
reason, the demand to terminate their occupancy of the
premises, mentioned in the earlier notice, was ineffective, that they would be guilty of unlawful detainer if they
failed to vacate said premises within 5 days after service
of that notice upon them (R. 233). Said notice further
informed Van Zyverdens that the triple damages claimed
in the pending legal proceedings were the same damages
as those mentioned in Exhibit 5, and that the service of
Ex:hibit 5 would not constitute a waiver of or affect the
pending actions.
Van Zyverdens failed to comply with the demands contained in Exhibit 5 and continued to occupy the farm.
Van Zyverdens objected to the introduction of Exhibit 5
into evidence (R. 545-546), apparently on the alleged
ground that it was served after these actions were commenced, however, as indicated above, Exhibit 5 was
served three days before the counterclaim was filed in
Case No. 9946, and the Court reserved ruling thereon
(R. 546, L. 9-12). The Court made no mention of Exhibit 5
in its decision (R. 189-190). Seagull moved the Court to
amend its pleadings to refer to Exhibit 5 (R. 545) when
Van Zyverdens objected to its admission into evidence,
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however, the Court did not rule on that motion.
Under the rules all that need be pleaded are ultimate
facts, it being unnecessary to set forth in detail the acts,
conduct, language or artifices used to accomplish the
result (Rule 8(a), URCP; Wilson v. Oldroyd, 1 U.2d 362,
267 P.2d 759, 763). A complaint is required only to give
the opposing party fair notice of the nature and basis or
grounds of the claim and a general indication of the type
of litigation involved. (Blackham v. Snelgrove, 3 U. 2d
156, 280 P .2d 453, 455.) The pleadings, as filed (R. 40-43,
258-273), and the pre-trial order (R. 182) all fully informed Van Zyverdens as to the relief sought by Seagull
and it was unnecessary to allege the service of any specific notices to state a cause of action for that relief since
service of such notices are merely evidence to be presented at the trial. The fact that specific notices may have
been mentioned in the pleadings does not limit the right
of Seagull to introduce evidence of other notices which
would establish evidence of facts necessary to support its
claims for relief at the time of trial. Since it was unnecessary to allege any specific notice in the complaint in
the first instance, the failure to mention exhibit 5 is
immaterial and should not prevent exhibit 5 from being
introduced into evidence. The Court erred in not admitting exhibit 5 into evidence. Seagull seeks restitution of
the premises and damages. Exhibit 5 is merely evidence
of facts which entitle Seagull to relief sought and Seagull
is not asking for new or different relief. This notice was
served 10 months before the trial and Van Zyverdens
cannot claim surprise or prejudice for its being introduced
into evidence.
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Rule 15 (a) URCP provides in part as follows:
" ... a party may amend his pleading only by leave
of court or by written consent of the adverse party;
and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires . ... " (Emphasis added)
If for any reason Seagull was required to specifically
allege the notice contained in Exhibit 5 in its complaint
before it could be admitted into evidence in this action
(which we deny), in view of the clear mandate of the
foregoing rule, the Court abused its discretion in refusing to permit Seagull to amend when the motion for
permission to amend was made at the time of trial (R.
545).
Rule 15 (b) contemplates the exact situation which occurred in our case where evidence is objected to as not
being within the issues of the pleadings, which rule reads
in part as follows:
" ... If evidence is objected to at the trial on the
ground that it is not within the issues made by the
pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be
amended when the presentation of the merits of the
action will be subserved thereby and the objecting
party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of
such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining
his action or defense upon the merits. The court shall
grant a continuance, if necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence." (Emphasis
added)
The policy of the law is to avoid a multiplicity of
actions and to resolve all issues that can be resolved in a
single action. It was for this very reason that these two
actions were consolidated for trial. The foregoing rule
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indicates that the Court is to inquire into the merits and
shall permit amendments during trial, if necessary, to get
at the merits of the case and that if unfairness or surprise
would result therefrom that the Court "shall" grant a
continuance to avoid prejudice to the other party instead
of excluding evidence which would assist in presenting
the merits of the case. This is a clear mandate for the
Court to look to the merits of the case rather than technicalities. In our situation the net effect of excluding Exhibit 5 would be to require Seagull to bring a separate
action based upon the service of Exhibit 5, if the Court
determined for any reason that the other notices served
were insufficient to establish a cause of action against
Van Zyverdens and in favor of Seagull for Unlawful
Detainer. In any event, Seagull's motion should have been
granted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 15(d),
URCP, concerning supplemental pleadings which reads
in part as follows:
"Upon motion of a party the court may, upon reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit
him to serve a supplernental pleading setting forth
transactions or occurrences or events which have
happened since the date of the pleading sought to be
supplemented . ..." (Emphasis added)
Van Zyverdens obviously agree that Seagull should be
permitted to amend its pleadings to refer to exhibit 5 as
shown by the following statement made by Van Zyverdens concerning this very same exhibit 5 at pages 4 and 5
of their memorandum filed in case number 9917 in the
Supreme Court of Utah in support of their complaint for
extraordinary writ. In that case a writ of prohibition was
obtained by Van Zyverdens to prevent Seagull from
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proceeding with a separate legal action filed in the District Court based upon service of the notice contained in
exhibit 5.
"The point is that the Van Zyverdens are now being
required to answer the Salt Lake County case and
proceed to trial where that case involves the same
precise claim for relief as is involved in the Wasatch
County actions. Argument was made to Judge
Hanson in the Salt Lake County case that Seagull
Investment Company should be permitted to proceed
there on the theory that it attached a notice which
had not been served at the time of the filing of the
case in Wasatch County. However, Seagull Investment Company asked leave to amend their complaint
in Wasatch County during the course of trial on
December 4, 1962 to attach the notice in question.
While they have not sought leave to file a supplemental complaint in the Wasatch County action, they
clearly have that right under the rule, and in that
event, the same record and defenses would be available to the Van Zyverdens obviating the necessity of
a new trial upon the same issues with a different
record." (Emphasis added)
The motion of Seagull to amend its pleadings to refer
to exhibit 5 was not directed to any specific subdivision of
Rule 15 and would apply with equal force to subdivision
(d) regarding supplemental pleadings, if the court found
that the notice was served after commencement of the
other actions (we have demonstrated above that it was
served 3 days before the counterclaim in Case No. 9946
was filed) and to the other subdivisions of Rule 15 discussed above, and the proposition presented to the Court
by Van Zyverdens in the above quoted statement in Case
No. 9917 fully supports Seagull's position that the District
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Court abused its discretion in not admitting exhibit 5 into
evidence andjor permitting an amendment to Seagull's
pleadings to refer to exhibit 5. Van Zyverdens should not
be permitted to talk out of both sides of their mouth, and
on the one hand to prevent Seagull from maintaining a
separate action based upon exhibit 5 (Case No. 9917), and
on the other hand to object to the admission of exhibit 5
into evidence in these cases.
That the policy of the law is to settle all matters
between the parties in one action and to avoid a multiplicity of actions is further illustrated by Rule 54 (c) ( 1)
pertaining to demands for judgment, which reads in part
as follows:
" ... every final judgment ... may, when the justice of
the case requires it, determine the ultimate rights of
the parties on each side as between or among themselves." (Emphasis added)
To leave the question of restitution of the premises unresolved and thereby require the filing of another lawsuit
to determine that issue is to ignore the clear mandate of
the foregoing rule. It is clear from the foregoing that Van
Zyverdens are in default in the performance of their
obligations concerning the purchase of the farm and that
they are tenants at will of the farm. The "Ultimate
Rights" of Seagull entitle them to possession of the farm.
For the Court to close its eyes to these "ultimate rights"
and to the service of Exhibit 5 (R. 233-240) is not only an
abuse of discretion by the Court, but is contrary to the
law and to the evidence, therefore the decision of the
Court should accordingly be reversed.
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POINT IV
THE COURT SHOULD HAVE AWARDED SEAGULL
THE RELIEF TO WHICH IT WAS ENTITLED
WHETHER DEMANDED OR NOT.
The Court indicated in its decision that Seagull could
have recovered possession of the farm if it had proceeded
differently, but that Seagull had elected to proceed under
the Unlawful Detainer Statute and had failed to comply
with the provision thereof requiring service of a notice
giving Van Zyverdens the option to perform the conditions or surrender the premises. The decision of the Court
reads in part as follows (R. 190) :
" ... While the said plaintiff and counterclaimant
might well have pursued a different course to recover
possession, it having elected to proceed under the
statute, it was necessary to comply with its provisions .... " (Emphasis added)
In essence the Court is indicating that Seagull proved
its case for restitution of the premises under the terms of
the contract (R. 226) but that, under the Court's view of
the pleadings filed, relief was not requested under any
theory other than the Unlawful Detainer Statute and
accordingly the Court could not grant any other relief to
Seagull, the Court having determined that the notice
served (R. 266-273) was insufficient to comply with the
requirements of the Unlawful Detainer Statute (R. 190).
Seagull attempted to plead claims for relief in the
alternative under both the breach of contract theory and
the unlawful detainer theory as more fully discussed
under point II ab.ove. The complaint (R. 261-262) and the
counterclaim (R. 42) clearly demonstrate that Seagull
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sought damages for breach of contract, restitution of the
premises and attorney fees, in addition to triple damages
for unlawful detainer. The complaint and counterclaim
also ask for such other general relief as the Court deems
proper in the circumstances. The policy of the law is to do
substantial justice to a party even if the pleadings are
inexpertly framed by his attorney. Rule 54(c) (1), URCP
provides in part as follows:

" ... every final judgment shall grant the relief to
which the party in whose favor it is rendered is
entitled, even if the party has not demanded such
relief in his pleadings . ..." (Emphasis added)
The Court erred in failing to apply this rule when it
indicated in its decision that Seagull was entitled to
possession of the farm, but that it had proceeded under
the wrong theory to obtain possession. Seagull denies that
it failed to ask for possession of the premises under the
theory of breach of contract, but even if Seagull completely failed to request restitution under the proper
theory, nevertheless, the Court, having determined that
Seagull was entitled to possession, and the evidence of the
breach by Van Zyverdens and their becoming tenants at
will clearly appearing throughout the record, should have
awarded restitution in accordance with the provisions of
the above quoted rule. (Wheelwright v. Roman, 50 U. 10,
165 P. 513; Buehner Block Co. v. Glezos, 6 U. 2d 226, 310
P. 2d 517.)
In addition judgment should be awarded for the reasonable rental value of the farm for the period during
which Van Zyverdens have had possession thereof of
$425.00 per month (see discussion R. 663) or for such
other sum as the Court determines to be reasonable.
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POINT V
SEAGULL IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AGAINST
VAN ZYVERDENS FOR TAXES, WATER ASSESSMENTS AND DAMAGES REQUESTED BUT NOT
RULED UPON BY THE COURT.
In both cases Seagull prayed, under the terms of the
contract (R. 226), for judgment for restitution of the
premises, for attorney fees (which are discussed elsewhere in this brief), and for damages for breach of contract (R. 42-43, 261-262). In Case No. 9945 separate causes
of action are stated for the $5,000.00 down payment which
was not paid, for property taxes in the sum of $333.98, and
irrigation water assessments of $397.82, which were paid
by Seagull (R. 40-43), but these causes of action were not
ruled upon by the Court. The evidence clearly shows that
Van Zyverdens contracted and agreed to pay said amounts
(R. 226) and that they were not paid (R. 543-544) and
accordingly Seagull is entitled, as a matter of law, to
judgment for said amounts and for restitution of the
premises, attorney fees and other damages established by
the evidence.

POINT VI
SEAGULL IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AGAINST
VAN ZYVERDENS FOR ATTORNEY FEES.
The Court failed to rule on Seagull's claim for attorney
fees (R. 43, 262) for the prosecution of these actions.
Seagull relies upon the provisions of paragraph 21 of
Exhibit 1 (R. 226) to establish its right to recover attorney fees, which provision reads as follows:
"21. The Buyer and Seller each agree that should
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they default in any of the covenants or agreements
contained herein, that the defaulting party shall pay
all costs and expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise or accrue from enforcing
this agreement, or in obtaining possession of the
premises covered hereby, or in pursuing any remedy
provided hereunder or by the statutes of the State of
Utah whether such remedy is pursued by filing a suit
or otherwise." (Emphasis added)
The election of Seagull to terminate Van Zyverdens'
interest in and to the farm and Exhibit 1 (R. 226) by
reason of their failure to remedy their default, does not in
any manner affect the rights of Seagull under that contract, including the right to recover attorney fees. Paragraph 16A thereof indicates that only the Seller (Seagull)
shall be released from obligation to convey the property
to the Buyers (Van Zyverdens). At no place in the contract or notices have the rights of Seagull been terminated
or affected. The Court should enforce the clear intention
of the parties as expressed by the written contract. Forrester v. Cook, 77 U. 137, 292 P. 206; Burt v. Stringfellow,
45 U. 207, 143 P. 234; Udy v. Jensen, 63 U. 94, 222 P. 597.
The wording of paragraph 21 (R. 226) indicates that
the parties contemplated this exact situation, where it
was necessary to enforce the rights of the sellers in the
event of default by the buyers, and the parties selected
broad language which would apply to all litigation which
might arise in connection with the contract including an
action under the terms of the contract or an action under
the Unlawful Detainer Statute. Attorney fees are accordingly recoverable by Seagull whether the action is maintained under the contract or under the Unlawful Detainer
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Statute. Additional evidence should be permitted to establish the value of the legal services, including those in
connection with this appeal.
CONCLUSION
The issues before the Court are clear. Van Zyverdens
acquired possession of the farm in question in September,
1960, with no down payment and since that time have
paid nothing toward the purchase price, have failed to
pay the property taxes, irrigation water assessments, or
to keep the property insured, although they have had the
use and benefit of the property during this entire period.
The Court found that their claim for an offset was without
foundation and awarded judgment of no cause of action.
During this period Seagull has been required to make
payments on the Michelsen contract (R. 230-231) and to
pay the property taxes and water assessments to avoid
total loss of the property. It is apparent that this prolonged litigation is an effort to put Seagull into such a
financial squeeze that they will be forced to sell the farm
to Van Zyverdens on the Van Zyverdens' terms to avoid
a total loss of the farm.
Van Zyverdens, with advice of counsel, have intentionally pursued a course of action in complete disregard of
the rights of Seagull. It would have been a simple matter
for Van Zyverdens to have made the payments due to
Seagull into the Court to preserve their rights under the
contract. The unpaid balance due on the contract was in
excess of $55,000.00, payable over a period of years, and
accordingly Van Zyverdens could have safely made their
payments to Seagull as well as pursue their legal action
for an offset, if they were bona fide about their claims,
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since the unpaid balance was sufficiently large to have
protected them to the extent of the entire $18,000.00
claimed by Van Zyverdens in their action.
It is also apparent that Van Zyverdens have at all times
been unable to meet their obligations under Exhibit 1, or
to pay for the farm.
The defenses raised by Van Zyverdens to the relief
sought by Seagull amount to nothing more than technical
objections to procedure, do not go to the merits and are
stalling actions. The various notices served upon Van
Zyverdens clearly appraised them of their option to remedy their default or to quit the premises. Nothing more
could be accomplished by the service of additional notices
since Van Zyverdens failed to make any effort to remedy
any of their defaults. Van Zyverdens are tenants at will
of the premises. Clearly Seagull is entitled to restitution
of the premises, attorney fees, and to damages. To affirm
the judgment of the District Court could only result in an
additional trial with the same parties, the same issues, and
the same evidence with the ultimate result that Seagull
would obtain the relief to which it is entitled. Clearly the
judgment of the District Court is contrary to the evidence
and to the law and should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
RONALD C. BARKER
Attorney for Seagull Investment Co.
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